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Breaking the Trade Barrier: Common Property
Solutions to Tropical Deforestation
Mara Kimmel Hoyt*
INTRODUCTION
Deforestation claims seventeen million hectares of the
world's tropical forests each year.' Tropical forests represent
most of the forest lands in developing nations, accounting for
forty-two percent of the world's forests. 2 Tropical forests benefit
the environment, economy and culture of Central and South
America, Southeast Asia, and West Central Africa.3 Rapid de-
forestation threatens the continued health and stability of these
regions.
The international community's response to tropical defores-
tation relies primarily on manipulating trade channels.4 The
success of these efforts, however, is limited. Effective solutions
to deforestation depend upon global approaches that lie beyond
the realm of international trade.
National land tenure policies bear directly on forest man-
agement and may proliferate deforestation. Today, policies that
privatize land and resources are typically heralded as the best
arrangement to promote resource conservation.5 This narrow
approach to land tenure policies precludes consideration of alter-
native ownership arrangements that may better suit the unique
conditions of developing nations. This Note argues that common
* The author is grateful to James Kelleher and Dr. Daniel Bromley for
their ideas and assistance in the development of this Note.
1. THE WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD RESOURCES: 1992-93 118
(1992) [hereinafter WORLD RESOURCES INSTrruTE].
2. Brian Chase, Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The Legality of Uni-
lateral Attempts to Promote Sustainable Development under the GATT, 17 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 349, 354-55 (1994). There are three types of
forests: temperate, boreal, or tropical. Id. Temperate forests are located be-
tween the tropics and the Arctic circle, and boreal forests are generally found in
arctic regions. Id.
3. Id.
4. See DURWOOD ZAELKE ET AL., TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, Eco-
NOMICS, AND POLICY (1993) (examining the relationship between trade and the
environment).
5. See infra Part III.B.
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property systems facilitate sustainable forest management 6 to a
greater degree than other systems, and therefore deserve na-
tional and global attention.
Beyond re-evaluating domestic land policies, combating de-
forestation requires cooperation between the international
arena, national governments, and local communities dependent
on forest resources. The international community is in a unique
position to promote such tri-level partnerships. These partner-
ships will enable national policy makers to effectively address
rising rates of tropical deforestation. Part I of this Note dis-
cusses deforestation in general, briefly analyzing its causes and
effects. Part II examines the international community's role in
simultaneously perpetuating and preventing tropical deforesta-
tion. Part III focuses on national land policies by providing a
framework analyzing land tenure arrangements and their po-
tential for achieving sustainable forest management. Part IV
delineates common property arrangements as an alternative
land management regime for developing nations. Part V ana-
lyzes the ability of the global community to promote common
property alternatives. This Note concludes that although trade
is part of the solution to tropical deforestation, the international
community must address a broader array of policy issues.
I. TROPICAL DEFORESTATION
Tropical deforestation accelerated dramatically during the
1980s. 7 The Food and Agriculture Organization issued a report
in 1991 finding that fifty percent more tropical forests were cut
and cleared than initially projected.8 Deforestation adversely
affects the natural environment, economic livelihood and cul-
tural viability of tropical nations.
Environmentally, the consequences of deforestation are se-
vere. According to the World Resources Institute, "[t]ropical de-
forestation is currently a significant environment and
development issue. Loss of tropical forests diminishes biodivers-
6. Sustainable forestry is managing a forest to provide a harvest level
maintained ad infinitum. DAVID M. SMITH, THE PRACTICE OF SILVICULTURE 428
(1986). For example, if a tree species takes one hundred years to grow to ma-
turity, when it is harvestable, and the managed forest area is one hundred
acres, then the area could sustain an annual harvest area equaling one acre.
7. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 118. The rate of defor-
estation was not nearly as dramatic in temperate or boreal forests and in some
cases the area of these forests has increased rather than decreased. Id.
8. Id. Original estimates projected that 11.3 million hectares would be
cut and cleared each year. Id.
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ity... contributes to climate change by releasing stored carbon
into the atmosphere, and often results in serious soil degrada-
tion, sometimes rendering the land unfit for future agricul-
ture."9 As tropical forests recede, forest products, fuel sources
and medicinal plants are lost. 10 Poor forest practices also cause
soil erosion, flooding and siltation which reduce agricultural
productivity."
Deforestation creates economic hardships. Rapid deforesta-
tion can transform timber exporters into importers. 12 If forest
depletion in the 1990s continues at the 1980's rate, the number
of tropical timber exporters will fall from thirty-three to less
than ten by 1999.13
Tropical forests are vital as well to many indigenous cul-
tures in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Over 500 million peo-
ple live in or near these forests. 14 These communities depend on
the forest for food, shelter, medicines and commercial prod-
ucts. 15 Government programs encouraging urban resettlement,
agricultural projects and timber operations erode the resource
base available to local populations.' 6
9. Id.
10. Dennis J. Maher, Deforestation in Brazil's Amazon Region: Magnitude,
Rate, and Causes, in ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT 85, 87 (Gunter Schramm et al. eds., 1989).
11. Id.; WORLD RESOURCES INsTITUTE, supra note 1, at 118.
12. Chase, supra note 2, at 356. For example, the Philippines, a timber
exporter in the 1960s and 1970s, became an importer in the 1980s. Id.
13. THE WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, TROPICAL FORESTRY: A CALL FOR Ac-
TION 10 (1985), cited in Robert Repetto, Overview, in PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE
MISUSE OF FOREST RESOURCES 10 (Robert Repetto & Malcolm Gillis eds., 1988).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. JASON W. CLAY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND TROPICAL FORESTS 2 (1988).
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Poverty is closely linked to deforestation.' 7 Tropical forests
are located in cash-poor, resource-rich countries.' 8 Interna-
tional trade in tropical wood provides much needed capital for
exporting countries. 19 It is not the primary cause of deforesta-
tion, however. 20 In fact, only one percent of all trees felled in
tropical forests are exported as logs or processed timber. 21 The
remainder are cleared as a result of state run programs
designed to provide fuelwood supplies and land for agriculture
and cattle grazing.22 In many tropical nations, these govern-
ment sponsored programs encourage the "development" of for-
ested areas.23 Forest lands are often poorly managed because a
nation's immediate needs outweigh the long term benefits of
well-managed forests.
The international community recently identified sustaina-
ble forest management as the preferred solution to deforesta-
tion.24 Sustainable forestry minimizes conflicts over forest
17. Despite the close connection between poverty and deforestation, the
tendency to blame poverty for deforestation is problematic. Poverty, like defor-
estation, is a result, not a cause, of deeper social and economic problems. In
this sense, perhaps it is more appropriate to view poverty as a co-symptom,
rather than a cause, of environmental destruction. Letter from Daniel
Bromley, Anderson-Bascom Professor of Agriculture Economics at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin Madison (Sept. 4, 1995) (on file with author).
The Food and Agriculture Organization disagrees. They echo the senti-
ment of many when they state, "[florest depletion in the developing world is not
fundamentally rooted in logging or even in clearing for agriculture. It is rooted
in poverty, underdevelopment and population growth. It is the success in con-
fronting these challenges that will ultimately determine the fate of the greater
part of the world's forests." FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY MANAGEMENT: WHAT
FUTURE FOR THE WORLD's FORESTS 118 (1993) [hereinafter FAO REPORT].
18. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 118-25.
19. Chase, supra note 2, at 360.
20. Id. at 359-60.
21. Id. at 356.
22. Maher, supra note 10, at 87.
23. Repetto, supra note 13, at 1, 15. Title to forest lands is conferred on
those who "improve" it by clearing the land for some other use. Id. at 15. In
addition to the environmental degradation that results, these land clearing pro-
grams displace indigenous communities and other forest dwellers. Id. By tak-
ing over ownership of forest lands, states vitiate the traditional rights of local
communities to manage forest resources. Id.
24. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: State-
ment of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation
and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/6/
Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992) [hereinafter Forestry Principles].
These principles reflect the international community's understanding that if we
are to meet the demands of future generations, sustainable management is the
appropriate target for global natural resources. Id. For a definition of sus-
tainability, see supra note 6.
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resources while enhancing opportunities for environmental sta-
bility, economic growth and cultural survival within tropical for-
est ecosystems. 25 While the global community has identified
sustainablity as a desirable forestry objective, no consensus has
emerged on how to implement this goal.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND
DEFORESTATION
Although the problems of deforestation seem domestic in
nature, the international community plays an important role in
both the cause and the cure of tropical deforestation. The global
community typically attempts to curb deforestation through
trade and assistance programs. These programs, however, meet
with limited success.
A. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A CAUSE OF
DEFORESTATION
International aid projects may have unintended, yet signifi-
cant, detrimental effects in developing countries. 26 Tropical for-
ests are a popular focus for internationally funded research
projects with multiple and often conflicting goals.27 Such
projects include programs to increase foreign earning capacity
through timber trade, relocate urban populations, and generate
food supplies through sound agricultural practices. 28 These pro-
grams often perpetuate deforestation even though originally
designed to prevent them.29
The global market's failure to properly reflect the replace-
ment costs of tropical woods also perpetuates deforestation.30
25. Id.
26. David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability & Partnership: A Model for
Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645, 2649 nn.
16-17 (1991).
27. CLAY, supra note 16, at 2.
28. Id.
29. Fred Pearce, High Stakes in the Rainforest, GUARDIAN, Oct. 19, 1990,
at 29. Pearce illustrates one example of an international plan to save the
rainforests that provided the Food and Agriculture Organization with the funds
to implement the Tropical Forestry Action Plan. Id. The FAO's Forestry De-
partment controlled the funds, and critics claim that this plan has accelerated,
rather than abated, deforestation. Id. This criticism stems from allegations
that the FAO Forestry Department emphasizes forest industry initiatives
rather than forest conservation measures. Id.
30. Chase, supra note 2, at 361-62. The price of temperate woods is typi-
cally much higher than that of tropical timber because tropical timber resources
are undervalued on the world market. Id.
1996]
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Market prices rarely include the social or environmental costs of
timber harvesting.31 The consistent undervaluation of tropical
timber in international and domestic markets leads to over-
exploitation. 32
The international community causes deforestation indi-
rectly. Conflicts between developed and developing nations over
economic and environmental issues prevent their cooperation in
solving deforestation problems. Developed nations blame devel-
oping nations for the rapid decline of tropical forests. 33 Con-
versely, developing nations see developed nations as "eco-
bullies" 34 insensitive to the economic needs of their citizens. 35
This dissension polarizes the global community and foments
suspicion between developed and developing nations.3 6
These conflicts are rooted in different ideas about the role of
environmental protection in economic development. Developed
nations have the luxury of a relatively secure economic struc-
ture. Wealthier countries can focus on environmental degrada-
tion because economic instability does not threaten their very
31. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 122.
32. Id.
33. Bertram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Or-
der, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 347, 382 (1994). Brown discusses concepts of "eco-
imperialism" and "green protectionism" in describing conflicts between devel-
oped and developing nations in solving international problems. Id.
34. Id.
35. FAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 118. The FAO condemns northern na-
tions for their haste in blaming developing nations for the world's environmen-
tal woes:
Condemnation of developing countries for the way in which they are
exploiting their forest resources is futile. The processes of encroach-
ment and forest clearing are for all practical purposes unstoppable at
the present levels of economic development in the great majority of the
tropical countries... [T]he forests of the tropics must increasingly be
brought under effective management to reach the point where they
constitute a sound land-use option that provides income for local peo-
ple and is economically sustainable. Industrialized countries have no
grounds for moral superiority in environmental matters. They remain
primarily responsible for ozone depletion, the threat of global warm-
ing, most of the use of irreplaceable fossil fuel resources and the deple-
tion of . . . other biological resources. . . . In urging developing
countries to conserve forest resources, they must be sensitive to
charges of eco-colonialism or eco-bullying and must accept that they
too not only must behave responsibly but also must bear a fair share of
the costs of conserving the global environment.
Id.
36. A recent newspaper account notes that "[many third world govern-
ments still see the West's 'concern' over the environment as a plot to curb their
growth, not as an opportunity to avoid the West's destructive pattern of devel-
opment." Ian Guest, The Rocky Road to Rio, GuARDLAN, Aug. 9, 1991, at 23.
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existence. The economic differential between developed and de-
veloping nations often precludes consensus on global environ-
mental issues, including the fate of tropical forests. One
particularly compelling illustration of the differences between
the world's rich and poor arose during the 1992 Earth Summit
in Rio:
The original idea among the developed countries was to produce a ring-
ing declaration in Rio which kids all over the world could hang on their
bedroom walls.' But then the developing countries rather unhelpfully
pointed out that many of the children in their part of the world don't
have bedrooms.
37
B. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT DEFORESTATION
Trade is a familiar channel in international relations and
an obvious place to look for multilateral cures to global
problems.38 The solutions posited for deforestation are no ex-
ception. The international community has instituted a variety
of trade mechanisms to address deforestation. 39 Because these
efforts have met with minimal success, it is important for policy
makers to reach beyond trade-based approaches.
1. The International Tropical Timber Agreement
Established in 1983, the International Tropical Timber
Agreement (ITTA)40 regulates international trade between pro-
ducer and consumer nations. 41 The agreement incorporates en-
vironmental principles by encouraging the "development of
national policies aimed at sustainable utilization and conserva-
tion of tropical forests."42 In 1990, the organizational arm of the
37. Frank McDonald, If This is Progress, We're in Deep Trouble, IRISH
TIMES, June 11, 1992, at 7, cited in Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, From Stock-
holm to Rio: A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles of International Envi-
ronmental Law, 21 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 215, 221 (1993).
38. Many analysts advocate free trade as a means for increasing environ-
mental protection. See Geza Feketukuty, The Link between Trade and Environ-
mental Policies, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 171, 179 (1993). See generally
Ambler H. Moss Jr., Global Trade as a Way to Integrate Environmental Protec-
tion and Sustainable Development, 23 ENVrL. L. REV. 711 (1993) (describing the
need to pursue both development and environmental protection).
39. See generally ZAELKE, supra note 4, at xiii - xv.
40. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNA-
TIONAL TROPICAL TIMBER AGREEMENT, U.N. Doc.TD/Timber/11/Rev.1, U.N.
Sales No. E.84.II.D.5 (1983).
41. See Chase, supra note 2, at 367-74 (describing the FITA's evolution and
its attempts to regulate the tropical timber trade).
42. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. No. 2351, IN-
TERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND WILDLIFE 5-44
(1991).
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ITTA adopted an objective stating that tropical timber exports
should come from "sustainably managed resources" by the year
2000.43
Despite this environmental caveat, the ITTA has failed to
ensure environmental sustainability in tropical forest areas.44
One reason for this failure is the inability of the signatory na-
tions to agree on a definition of sustainability.45 Another reason
is the structure of the ITTA itself. The ITTA's voting system
slants power toward the primary producer and consumer na-
tions,46 arguably promoting its trade goals at the expense of its
conservation goals.
2. The Failed Attempt to Use Trade Barriers
Consumer nations have proposed a variety of trade meas-
ures to force developing countries to adopt sustainable forest
practices. One measure proposed levying import surcharges to
fund projects promoting sustainable forestry.47 Another ap-
proach focused on market-oriented incentives to promote sus-
tainable development through timber certification. 48 Neither
has been adopted, and both are controversial.
The potentially undesirable side effects that may accom-
pany trade restrictions compound the difficulty of reaching a
43. Chase, supra note 2, at 371.
44. See id. at 369-71.
45. Id. at 371.
46. Id. at 369. Voting in the ITTA is weighted. The system first distributes
votes between consumer and producer nations, then within each camp accord-
ing to each nation's level of consumption or production. Id. Japan holds the
most votes of any consumer nation; the United States is a distant second. Id.
Japan imports almost sixty percent of its timber, while the United States im-
ports slightly less than ten percent. Id.
Malaysia is the primary producer nation, exporting over forty percent of all
tropical timber compared to Indonesia's nineteen percent. Id. Malaysia thus
retains the most votes among producer nations. The amount of a nation's tropi-
cal timber land in no way contributes to calculating its voting power within the
ITTA. Id.
47. WORLD RESOURCES INsTrrUTE, supra note 1, at 122. Timber producers
resisted this suggestion because of its potential to lower prices. Id. Producers
argued that the devaluation of timber would encourage the conversion of forest
lands to more lucrative non-forest uses such as agriculture. Id.
48. Sharif Haron, Malaysia: Ensuring Good Forest Management, Bus.
TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1994, at 4. Environmentalists and some Western European
countries suggest certifying timber from sustainably managed forests. Id.
There are no internationally adopted standards for such a labeling scheme,
however, and timber producers criticize certification because the proposal does
not include temperate and boreal wood. Id.
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multilateral agreement.49 A recent dispute between Austria
and Malaysia over timber certification illustrates how trade bar-
riers can fail. In 1992, Austria passed legislation requiring
woods containing tropical timber to certify whether or not the
wood was produced from sustainably managed forests. 50 This
legislation also imposed an import tax on all products made from
tropical wood.51 Austria attempted to adopt a consumer-ori-
ented approach to pressure producing nations to implement sus-
tainable forest management.
The legislation backfired, however, and Austria's efforts to
impose trade restrictions on tropical timber producing nations
failed.52 Malaysia alleged discriminatory treatment in a formal
complaint through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)53 because Austria did not impose similar restrictions on
temperate wood.54 Malaysia ultimately reached a compromise
with Austria and withdrew its complaint.55 This dispute exem-
plifies the tension between tropical nations and the developed
world over the environment and its role in economic
development. 56
C. LIMITS OF TRADE-BASED SOLUTIONS
Many trade analysts concerned with environmental protec-
tion believe trade reform is vital to promote sustainable resource
development. 57 However, trade barriers such as quotas or ex-
port bans may be illegal under the GATT. 58 The legality of trop-
49. For example, Thailand implemented a ban on log exports in order to
conserve its remaining forests. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at
122. As a result, an illegal timber market began to thrive and legal timber
operators sold out to black marketeers over whom the Thai government could
exercise no control. Id.
50. Chase, supra note 2, at 375-76.
51. Id. at 375.
52. Id. at 376-79.
53. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Apr. 15,
1994 in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 21, GATT Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter
GATT].
54. Sharif Haron, Malaysia: Labeling Must Apply to All Timber, Bus.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1994, at 1.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Fadzil Gbazali, Malaysia: Anti-Tropical Timber Drive a Heavy
Burden, Bus. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1994, at 2 (addressing the contention of develop-
ing nations that deforestation is actually worse in temperate nations).
57. Charles Arden-Clarke, An Action Agenda for Trade Policy Reform to
Support Sustainable Development: A United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development Follow-up, in ZAELKE, supra note 4, at 72.
58. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 122.
1996] 203
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ical timber certification under the GATT has never been tested,
although many speculate that such a scheme could not with-
stand the GATT's non-discrimination provisions. 59
Moreover, manipulating market consumption patterns
through trade techniques is unlikely to have a major effect on
global consumption of tropical wood.60 Tropical timber accounts
for only ten percent of the world's timber supply and only one
percent of all tropical timber felled is ultimately exported.6 1
Any remedy directed only at international trade in timber will
therefore have a marginal effect.
Despite the low percentage of tropical wood reaching inter-
national markets, timber is vital to the domestic economies of
developing countries. 62 Erecting trade barriers that curtail eco-
nomic growth could increase poverty and intensify deforestation.
Any approach which exacerbates poverty will necessarily exac-
erbate deforestation. Likewise, any approach which attempts to
stem deforestation without alleviating poverty cannot succeed.
Trade policies alone do not adequately promote sustainable
tropical forest management. Because trade barriers risk foster-
ing resentment between developed and developing nations, the
international community should look beyond trade based ap-
proaches. Alternative solutions should focus on domestic re-
source management policies because they provide a more
effective approach to deforestation.
III. NATIONAL LAND POLICIES AND DEFORESTATION
The way a nation defines property rights impacts the health
of its land and resources. Property rights encompass a range of
privileges and commensurate responsibilities granted to individ-
59. Chase, supra note 2, at 379-87.
60. Id. at 361. Conservationists disagree and have called for outright bans
on imports of tropical timber in order to promote sustainable forest manage-
ment. See Peter Osborne, Malaysia: Environmentalists Seek Ban on Sarawak's
Rich Timber Exports, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Aug. 28, 1990, at 36S (describing the
differing perceptions of conservation groups and the timber industry over the
influence of consumption patterns on the tropical timber trade). Environmen-
talists argue that tropical timber should be imported only from sustainably
managed forests. Id. Timber producers, on the other hand, contend that such a
tactic would decrease the value of forests and therefore lead to greater defores-
tation. Id.
61. Chase, supra note 2, at 356, 361. See also Brian Johnson, Crisis for the
World's Forests, THE INDEPENDENT, July 3, 1989, at 13 (exploring the myth that
deforestation is largely caused by logging).
62. Chase, supra note 2, at 360. For example, timber is Indonesia's second
highest export earner behind oil and gas. Id.
[Vol. 5:195
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uals in a particular asset such as land.6 3 Governments demar-
cate property rights and dictate the use and allocation of these
rights. 64 The health of the natural environment depends on how
governments establish access to land and natural resources.
A. TAXONOMY OF PROPERTY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
There are four distinct management regimes: state, private,
common property, and open access. 65 In a state management
system, the government owns the land.66 Individuals have ac-
cess to land and resources, but that access is subject to state
control. 67 Management decisions are the responsibility of the
state.68
Private property regimes transfer property from the govern-
ment to private individuals through direct sales or disposal pro-
grams.69 The right to exclude others is a critical aspect of
private ownership.7 0 Individual landholders must manage their
resources in ways consistent with public laws but generally re-
tain wide latitude to make management decisions.7 1
63. GARY LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (1989). Property
ownership involves responsibilities as well as rights. Theoretically, these re-
sponsibilities require that the owner incur the costs of resource use decisions.
Id. at 10. In reality, many of the costs associated with environmental decisions
are borne by adjacent landholders, governments, or other citizens who suffer
from adverse environmental decisions.
64. Id. at 1.
65. DANIEL BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
PUBLIC POLICY 22 (1991). Bromley's work reflects commonly understood prop-
erty types, but specifically differentiates common property regimes in order to
point out their applicability in certain natural resource management contexts.
Distinguishing common property from open access regimes sets Bromley apart
from many other resource policy analysts who fail to see a difference between
the two.
66. Id. at 23.
67. Id. at 147.
68. Id. There are two types of state management regimes. The first in-
cludes land designations such as parks or preserves which the government ac-
tively manages. Id. The second type involves land for which the state has not
yet dedicated a use. Id. In the latter instance, the lack of management precipi-
tates free riders. Id.
69. See id. at 24-25. Upon claiming sovereign title to the land, govern-
ments often institute programs that grant land tenure to individuals upon the
clearing and utilization of"unused" lands. Repetto, supra note 12, at 15. This
type of program often results in governments displacing established indigenous
communities. Id.
70. LIBEcAP, supra note 63, at 1.
71. BROMLEY, supra note 65, at 24, 31.
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Common property systems are similar to private property
regimes in a variety of ways. 72 Both systems are predicated on
the right to exclude access to outsiders. 73 The rights holders in
both regimes retain management authority for their land and
resources subject to state and federal laws.7 4 The primary dif-
ference between private and common property is that the com-
munity rather than an individual dictates rights to the
resources. 75 The role of individuals in this regime is far from
minimized, however, as each individual community member has
rights and duties involved with land and resources. 76 Indige-
nous communities typify such arrangements as they are charac-
terized by communally controlled access and use patterns.7 7
The fourth system, open access, has no definable structure
for property rights and management. 78 Open access regimes are
created when there is no management system in place or when
an existing system breaks down.79 Without defined property
rights, no commensurate duties are imposed on resource
users.8 0 Resource economists generally agree that the lack of
property rights causes resource exploitation.8 1 When no one
bears any obligation to consider the impact of resource use, ex-
ploitation will lead to "tragedies of the commons"8 2 and free
72. Id. at 25-29.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. "Indigenous People" is a difficult term to define. The World Council of
Indigenous Peoples has adopted a formal definition: "Indigenous people shall be
people living in countries which have populations composed of different ethnic
or racial groups who are descendants of the earliest populations which survive
in the area, and who do not, as a group, control the national governments of the
countries within which they live." JOHN H. BODLEY, VICTIMS OF PROGRESS 166-
67 (1982). For further discussion on how indigenous communities typify com-
mon property regimes, see infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
78. BROMLEY, supra note 65, at 30.
79. Id. See also Repetto, supra note 13, at 16. Repetto attributes the mis-
management of forest resources to the displacement of common property sys-
tems by open access systems. Id. Displacing indigenous management systems
weakens traditional controls over management. Id. Thus forests become vul-
nerable to open access problems. Id.
80. BROMLEY, supra note 65, at 31.
81. See, e.g., Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Sci., Dec. 13,
1968, at 1243-48.
82. BROMLEY, supra note 65, at 22. Garret Hardin coined the phrase "trag-
edy of the commons" to describe the fate of resources held in common, i.e., not
privately owned. Hardin, supra note 81, at 1243-48. Hardin's thesis, that re-
sources held in common are subject to overexploitation, has become a truism in
modern day policy discourse concerning land management regimes. Fikret
206 [Vol. 5:195
SOLUTIONS TO TROPICAL DEFORESTATION 2
rider problems.83 Uncontrolled access exacerbates resource
degradation.
B. DOES PRIVATIZATION ENSURE PRESERVATION?
Advocates of privatization claim that natural resources are
best protected when privately owned.8 4 These theorists place a
premium on "efficiency" and reason that market forces most
properly allocate resources.85 In support of their hypothesis,
privatization theorists point to environmental organizations
that purchase pollution credits and buy land for habitat preser-
vation.8 6 They conclude that environmental destruction is
rooted in poorly defined property regimes.8 7
Property rights constitute a structure of economic incen-
tives that impact individuals and communities.88 Private prop-
erty advocates believe these economic incentives bear
environmentally positive fruit only when resources are privately
Berkes et al., The Benefits of the Commons, NATURE, July 13, 1989, at 91.
Berkes and others, while agreeing that tragedies can result under open access
systems, dispute the application of Hardin's thesis to common property re-
sources. See infra part V.C.
83. The problem of free riders is a correlate of the tragedy of the commons.
Free riders are those individuals who respond to economic incentives to exploit
resources at no cost to them, leading to the degradation of the land and re-
sources. Carlisle Ford Runge, Common Property and Collective Action in Eco-
nomic Development, 14 WORLD DEV. 623, 624 (1986).
84. See RICHARD STROUP & JOHN BADEN, NATURAL RESOURCES: BUREAU-
CRATIC MYTHS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 16 (1983).
85. Id. Stroup and Baden state that markets promote flexibility and indi-
vidual freedom only when:
property rights to each resource are privately held and easily transfer-
able, ensuring that decision makers will have an incentive to identify
the highest value of their resources. ... In the absence of such clearly
defined and enforceable rights, resources may be utilized by individu-
als who need not compensate or outbid anyone for their use, resulting
in substantial waste.
Id. at 16.
86. BROMLEY, supra note 65, at 34-38. See also STROUP & BADEN, supra
note 84, at 17-19.
87. STROUP & BADEN, supra note 84, at 17. Stroup and Baden describe the
free rider problem as particularly acute in the context of natural resources. Id.
at 19. Because ownership in a system of non-defined resources is not recog-
nized until someone extracts a resource benefit, there is an incentive for indi-
viduals to withdraw the resource as quickly as possible, thus resulting in its
misallocation and waste. Id. at 20.
88. Daniel Bromley, Economic Dimensions of Community-based Conserva-
tion, in NATURAL CONNECTIONS: PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVA-
TION 432 (David Western & R. Michael Wright, eds., 1994) [hereinafter
Economic Dimensions].
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held and transferable.8 9 Conversely, environmental destruction
occurs when resources are open to all without cost or
consequence. 90
Within this theoretical construct, global trade exacerbates
environmental destruction because nations with established pri-
vate property regimes trade with nations having open access re-
gimes. 91 Weak property regimes keep production costs low for
exporter nations. These low costs attract developed property na-
tions because their resource extraction costs are necessarily
higher. The variation in property regimes, according to this the-
ory, creates a vicious cycle in which countries with ill defined
property rights continue to exploit their resources to satisfy the
demands of importing countries. 92
The policy debate thus far has been cast as an either-or situ-
ation. A government either adopts a property regime conferring
rights upon individuals or it grants no-one rights to a given re-
source. 93 This dichotomy, however, is false. 94
Policy makers consistently confuse open access systems
with common property systems, blurring their subtle but funda-
mental differences. 95 Policy decisions are thus predicated on a
false choice between open access systems with no management
structure and private property regimes in which management
responsibility is well-defined. 96 Given the environmental degra-
dation associated with open access systems, this choice appears
easy to make. By neglecting common property systems, policy
makers place undue emphasis on privatizing resources as the
way to insure environmental stability.97
89. STROUP & BADEN, supra note 84, at 16.
90. Graciela Chichilnisky, North South Trade and the Global Environment,
84 AM. ECON. REv. 851, 853 (1994).
91. Id. at 852.
92. Id.
93. See generally id. at 853. Chichilnisky makes no distinction between
common property and open access systems, and uses the terms interchangea-
bly. This leads to erroneous conclusions about the efficacy of common property
systems.
94. BROMLEY, supra note 65, at 22. Bromley criticizes economists and envi-
ronmental policy makers who do not differentiate between common property
and open access regimes. Id. He claims that this misunderstanding, coupled
with the fallacy of the tragedy of the commons, denies the possibility that re-
source users can act together to institute a workable resource management sys-
tem. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 147.
97. Id.
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C. OBSTACLES TO ADOPTING COMMON PROPERTY
ARRANGEMENTS
Common property advocates assert that such systems can
benefit natural ecosystems as well as local communities.98 Sev-
eral obstacles, however, prevent incorporating common property
alternatives into the policy debate. The confusion of common
property regimes and open access systems presents a primary
obstacle. Common property regimes superficially resemble open
access systems. Neither system uses written title or otherwise
officially demarcated boundaries. 99 A lack of formal recording
systems does not imply a lack of management. Indeed, the fact
that common property regimes are actively managed, whereas
open access systems lack management, goes to the heart of the
difference between these two systems. 100 Failing to recognize a
management structure within common property regimes blurs
the boundary between the systems. 101
A second obstacle to implementing common property re-
gimes involves translating them into a modern context.10 2
Although common property systems worked well when popula-
tion densities were lower, applying such regimes to today's
demographics is questionable. 103 In an increasingly interdepen-
dent world, common property regimes may not be able to meet
the needs of non-local populations without modification.10 4
Likewise, the ability of these regimes, without modification, to
sustainably manage valuable resources in the face of increasing
population pressures is dubious. 105
The political marginalization of indigenous cultures is the
third obstacle to implementing common property systems. In or-
der for these systems to work, national governments must de-
volve authority to local community groups. 10 6 Private property
systems only work when owners can rely on enforcement of their
98. Economic Dimensions, supra note 88, at 428.
99. Runge, supra note 83, at 624.
100. See BROMLEY, supra note 65, at 25-31. See also Fikret Berkes, Intro-
duction and Overview, in COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: ECOLOGY AND COMMU-
NITY BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 8 (Fikret Berkes ed., 1989).
101. BROMLEY, supra note 65, at 147.
102. See CLAY, supra note 16, at 2; Runge, supra note 83, at 623. Both au-
thors discuss the viability of converting traditional systems of common property
ownership into modem systems.
103. Runge, supra note 83, at 623.
104. CLAY, supra note 16, at 2.
105. Id. at 4.
106. Economic Dimensions, supra note 88, at 436-37.
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individual interests by a state government. 10 7 The right to con-
trol land use must be similarly enforceable in common property
systems.108 The reluctance of state governments to validate
common property systems reflects their hesitation to share land
use authority with local communities.
This reluctance has been overcome to a limited degree in the
U.S. and Canadian Arctic through the adoption of cooperative
management systems.'0 9 Cooperative management allocates
authority and expertise for management decisions between local
communities and state and national governments.11-0 By shar-
ing responsibility for resource decisions, cooperative manage-
ment structures a discourse between state authorities and local
residents."' This amalgam of common property and state man-
agement often provides the best opportunities for managing im-
portant resources.
D. EFFECTS OF NEGLECTING COMMON PROPERTY SYSTEMS IN
NATIONAL LAND TENURE POLICIES
The failure to identify common property as a distinct land
management regime has three important policy consequences.
First, working management regimes are supplanted with less ef-
ficient systems. State governments inevitably nationalize large
tracts of natural areas, displacing indigenous communities and
107. Id. at 437.
108. Id. at 439.
109. See generally David Case, Subsistence and Self-Determination: Can
Alaska Natives Have a More "Effective Voice"? 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 1009 (1989)
(discussing different cooperative management structures and their efficacy in
Alaskan resources management).
110. Cooperative management is defined as an:
institutional arrangement in which government agencies with jurisdic-
tion over resources and user groups enter into an agreement... and
make explicit (1) a system of rights and obligations for those interested
in the resource, (2) a collection of rules indicating actions that subjects
are expected to take under various circumstances, and (3) procedures
for making collective decisions affecting the interests of government
actors, user organizations, and individual users.
Gail Osherenko, Wildlife Management in the North American Arctic: The Case
for Co-Management, in TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND RENEWABLE RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 94 (Milton Freeman & L. Carbyn, eds., 1988) (citation omitted).
111. In addition, involving local communities to a greater degree in resource
management decisions achieves a variety of international policy goals. Lee
Breckenridge, Protection of Biological and Cultural Diversity: Emerging Recog-
nition of Local Community Rights in Ecosystems under International Environ-
mental Law, 59 TENNm L. REV. 735, 767-75 (1992). Breckenridge cites some
examples of "co-management" systems (resource management agreements be-
tween local communities and state) that may serve as paradigms for achieving
sustainable forest management. Id.
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their common property management systems. 112 Since common
property systems are invisible and their communities politically
powerless, they offer little effective resistance to nationaliza-
tion. 11 3 The land is then either sold to private entities or lapses
into an open access system.
Second, the confusion between common property and open
access wrongly attributes environmental degradation to both
systems.1 14 This misunderstanding fosters the conclusion that
privatization is the best solution in any context. 115 Privatiza-
tion is not always the most appropriate land tenure system,
however. Rural village communities have unique attributes
making it difficult for a private property regime to comport with
their economic and cultural realities. Private property rights
that rely on intricate systems of surveying and registration are
expensive to define and enforce.11 6 The wealthy economies of
developed nations assimilate these costs more easily than the
economies of the developing world. Similarly, village economies
are often much more dependent on the health of a local agricul-
tural and natural resource base than are urban communities. 1 17
Assignment of exclusive rights to a given piece of land is inher-
ently unfair in a village setting because it excludes others who
are equally dependent on that resource. 118
Third, the false dichotomy between private regimes and
open access systems precipitates environmentally unsound poli-
cies. State run programs emphasize and reward efforts to "use"
forest lands, often to the detriment of the natural environ-
ment." 9 These programs are culturally biased, as the state fails
to reward the similar efforts of indigenous communities to util-
ize natural resources.' 20 These policy choices flow from a fail-
112. Repetto, supra note 13, at 16.
113. The displacement of local common property systems is a recent phe-
nomenon in many countries. For example, until the 1970s, tribal chiefs in
Ghana governed the rights to the forest resources in a common property sys-
tem. Id.
114. Runge, supra note 83, at 623-24. Runge asserts that environmental
degradation is only attributable to open access systems. Id. See also BROMLEY,
supra note 65, at 22.
115. This conclusion is buttressed by the free market arguments. See supra
part IV.B.
116. Runge, supra note 83, at 624.
117. Id. at 625.
118. Id.
119. CLAY, supra note 16, at 1.
120. Id. See also Repetto, supra note 13, at 15 (stating that Native people
can obtain title by clearing and cultivating land).
1996]
MIN. J GLoBAL TRADE
ure to completely understand the different land management
options that are available.
IV. COMMON PROPERTY ALTERNATIVES
A. THE PROMISE OF COMMON PROPERTY
Common property systems provide opportunities for envi-
ronmental stability, cultural survival, and economic growth.
Private property systems marginalize local communities and
contribute to current environmental instability.121 Empower-
ing local people by giving them decision making authority as-
sists in the preservation of globally important resources because
local communities depend on the resources and land on which
they live. 122 This dependence has important ramifications for
land management. 123
There are four characteristics of local communities that
lend themselves to attaining international environmental goals:
(1) a long term knowledge of the surrounding ecosystems; (2)
traditional agricultural and other practices that foster the pro-
ductivity and renewability of resources; (3) community organi-
zation that regulates access to resources in a sustainable
manner; and (4) community values that emphasize permanency
in a given area, respect for that area, and responsibility to fu-
ture generations. 124
Common property systems offer economic opportunities.
Forests provide resins, essential oils, medicinal substances, rat-
tan, flowers, and a number of other commercially valuable prod-
ucts.' 25 The value of these products is substantial.' 26 Local
121. Breckenridge, supra note 111, at 739.
122. A critical component of the definition of indigenous people is their de-
pendence on the natural environment for food, shelter, culture, and ritual. Wil-
liam Shutkin, International Human Rights Law and the Earth: The Protection
of Indigenous Peoples and the Environment, 31 VA. J. INA'L L. 479, 484 n.21
(1991).
123. Spatially, local involvement in resource management can positively im-
pact the health of local natural resources. Breckenridge points out that "ecolo-
gists now note that biological diversity and ecological stability often coincide
with the traditional territories of communities that have successfully relied on
the sustained productivity of local renewable resources." Breckenridge, supra
note 111, at 746 (citation omitted).
Temporally, the pattern of resource use over time tends toward sus-
tainability as local communities have a vested interest in the survival of their
future generations. "Communities that depend directly on the renewability of
biological resources in a given area for their livelihood have a special stake in
sustaining and protecting the biological resource base for local uses." Id.
124. Id. at 746-48.
125. Repetto, supra note 13, at 12.
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communities realize the economic potential of forest products,
but tend to limit their exploitation of those resources in a sus-
tainable manner in order to provide for their current needs and
the needs of future generations. 127 Common property systems
offer a model for sustainable forest management because they
can support the cultural and economic needs of a community
while promoting the health of the surrounding ecosystem.
B. THE GROWING THEORETICAL ACCEPTANCE AND PRACTICAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMON PROPERTY SYSTEMS
Common property systems provide a complete theoretical
paradigm for sustainably managing forest resources. 12 Many
studies of both historic and contemporary indigenous systems
document sustainable management techniques, and provide a
model for applying such systems in a modern context. 129 In-
volving local communities in managing the world's tropical for-
ests is gaining acceptance in both environmental theory and
practice.
Theoretically, the proposition that management authority
be shared between local communities and national governments
is supported in a non-binding statement of forest management
principles adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit.'3 0 That state-
ment advocates recognizing and supporting the rights of indige-
nous peoples to "enable them to have an economic stake in forest
use, perform economic activities, and achieve and maintain cul-
tural identity ... through... those land tenure arrangements
which serve as incentives for the sustainable management of
forests."'31
Practically, some nations recognize that local communities
maintain sustainable forest practices and include these commu-
126. For example, in the early 1980s, exported forest products provided
$125 million a year to Indonesia. Id.
127. Breckenridge, supra note 111, at 745-46.
128. Berkes, supra note 100, at 15.
129. See generally CONSERVATION OF NEOTROPICAL FORESTS: WORKING FROM
TRADITIONAL RESOURCE USE (Kent Redford & Christine Padoch, eds. 1992)
(providing a multitude of case studies examining sustainable management sys-
tems found in indigenous cultures); CLAY, supra note 16 (documenting a variety
of examples in different developing nations of indigenous forest management
systems as examples of sustainable models of resource use); Berkes, supra note
100 (comparing common property systems to open access systems).
130. Forestry Principles, supra note 24, at 5(a).
131. Id.
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nities in the planning and management of national forests. 132
Converting forest lands into common property systems is not
generally an obstacle to implementing such policies because
most tropical forests in developing nations are owned by the
state. 133 Therefore, state condemnation of private property is
not usually an issue.' 34
Implementing common property systems reestablishes
traditional methods of management that predate state owner-
ship. State ownership often displaced local management sys-
tems but failed to replace them with other functioning
structures, resulting in the exploitation of natural resources. 135
By re-instituting common property systems, governments estab-
lish a working management system which provides a sensible
alternative to the lack of control characterized by an open access
regime.
V. THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY'S ROLE IN PROMOTING
COMMON PROPERTY ALTERNATIVES
Tropical deforestation is a geographically specific event with
global consequences. International efforts are vital to lowering
the rate of tropical deforestation. To be effective, these efforts
132. JOINT MANAGEMENT OF FOREST LANDS: EXPERIENCES FROM SOUTH ASIA
32 (1990). For example, in Nepal, a 1977 National Forestry Plan allowed com-
munity involvement in managing national forests. Id. The plan was later up-
dated by a 1989 plan that similarly emphasized community control over
management authority of Nepal's forests. Id. This planning process took ad-
vantage of functioning indigenous forest management systems as defined by the
traditional community structure. Id. at 42-43. This effort is ongoing with con-
stant re-evaluation of the ways in which the national forest management sys-
tem can integrate local, indigenous management systems. Id. The full
management potential of these systems will not be realized, however, until
planners and foresters understand the existing social structure and the na-
tional government adopts policies that recognize and integrate these structures.
Id. at 43.
Colombia provides another example where responsibility for land manage-
ment was returned to local indigenous populations. See generally PETER BUNY-
ARD, THE COLOMBIAN AMAZON: POLICIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF ITS INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT (1989) (describing the Colombian policy of
devolving forest management to local tribes in an effort to implement sustaina-
ble forestry). Indian populations are able to survive in the rain forest in a man-
ner that "enables sustainability without causing long term damage." Id. at
116. Eighteen million hectares have been returned to the indigenous peoples of
the Columbian Amazon, the majority of this transfer since 1988. Id.
133. Repetto, supra note 13, at 16. Over 80% of closed forest lands are pub-
licly held according to a comprehensive FAO assessment. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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should formulate a framework for cooperation with national gov-
ernments and local communities within tropical regions. The
strategic response to tropical deforestation should integrate al-
ternative land tenure arrangements. 136
On a local level, partnerships between local communities
and the international community help create responsible envi-
ronmental policies in developing nations. 137 Such a framework
ensures that international aid programs help, not hurt, people
in the regions targeted by these programs. 38 Ironically, inter-
national environmental organizations have far greater leverage
in policy making than the citizens of developing nations.' 39
Forming meaningful partnerships between international envi-
ronmental organizations and local communities will empower
these communities. As a result, the ability of local people to
change national land policies will be strengthened. 40 Grass
roots involvement in determining global environmental policies
comports well with the international environmental agenda af-
ter the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.14 '
Some criticize this approach for neglecting the interests of
national governments. International trade policies can respond
to this criticism. By instituting a system of trade preferences,
the international community provides the governments of devel-
oping nations with an economic incentive to work with the local
communities and the international arena.
The Generalized System of Preferences 142 (GSP) exemplifies
this type of approach. The GSP is one way the United States
effectuates particular policies within developing nations. The
136. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 121.
137. Wirth, supra note 26, at 2649. The author developed a partnership
model of advocacy to promote cooperation between international and domestic
organizations in developing international aid priorities for environmental
projects. Id.
138. Partnership, as Wirth defines it, refers to cooperation between exter-
nal, international environmental organizations (in Wirth's analysis, those orga-
nizations located in the United States who can exert a great deal of influence
over determining international aid programs) and the foreign interests they
purport to represent. Id. at 2651.
139. Id. at 2652.
140. Id. at 2659.
141. Breckenridge, supra note 111, at 736.
142. This system is part of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. V.,
§§ 501-05, 88 Stat. 2066 (1975) (codified as amended in 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65
(1988)), cited in James Kelleher, Note, The Child Labor Deterrence Act: Ameri-
can Unilateralism and the GATT, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 161, 163 (1994).
The GSP allows the President of the United States to provide duty free treat-
ment for any eligible article from any beneficiary developing country. Id.
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U.S. bestows duty free tariffs upon "beneficiary developing coun-
tries"143 who comply with U.S. policy goals. 1 " Currently, the
GSP offers an incentive for developing countries to comply with
workers' rights standards. 145
GSP or similar trade benefits consistent with the GATT
could be the "carrot" to encourage nations to develop manage-
ment practices that involve local communities, such as common
property systems. The GSP system provides one example of how
trade policies could encourage adopting sustainable forest poli-
cies by requiring the involvement of local people in forestry
decisions.
Local communities contribute unique knowledge, manage-
ment practices, and values integral to the development of sus-
tainable management principles. 146 They are proven resource
managers and provide a functional model of sustainability. 147
Common property land tenure arrangements require significant
local involvement which satisfies this global environmental
goal.148
Common property systems require sharing political power
between national governments and local people. Therefore, the
cooperation of national governments is essential to the develop-
ment of these regimes.1 49 Economic incentives embodied by the
GSP facilitate this type of cooperation. These efforts by devel-
oped nations would demonstrate to tropical timber producers
that they are serious about sustainable forest management. By
"putting their money where their mouths are," developed na-
tions would ease the distrust between themselves and tropical
nations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Common property systems offer a means to reduce the rate
of deforestation and still provide for local economic and cultural
needs. The role of the international community in establishing
these systems is vital. Future efforts should encourage partner-
ships between international environmental organizations, na-
tional governments and local communities. International
143. Juli Stensland, Note, Internationalizing the North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 141, 151 (1995).
144. Id. at 151 n.74.
145. Id. at 151-52.
146. Breckenridge, supra note 111, at 746-48.
147. Id. at 737.
148. Forestry Principles, supra note 24, at 5(a).
149. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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recognition of common property as a workable regime that sup-
ports sustainable management gives credibility to common prop-
erty systems. Policies promoting sustainable forest
management should identify and incorporate these systems as
an appropriate management tool. Offering economic incentives
to nations implementing such policies may secure the coopera-
tion of national governments in meeting global environmental
goals.

